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A B S T R A C T   
This essay uses the case of Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico to discuss “the coloniality of disaster”: how cata-
strophic events like hurricanes, earthquakes, but also other forms political and economic crisis deepen the fault 
lines of long-existing racial and colonial histories. It argues that disaster capitalism needs to be understood as a 
form of racio-colonial capitalism and that this in turn requires us to question our understandings of both 
“resilience” and “recovery.” The article focuses on the “wait of disaster” as a temporal logic of state subjugation 
and on how Puerto Ricans responded to state abandonment through modes of autogestion, or autonomous 
organizing. It concludes that while resiliency can be coopted in service of a neoliberal recovery, it can also be the 
site for gestating new forms of sovereignty and new visions of postcolonial recovery.   
1. Introduction 
In September of 2017, two back to back hurricanes hit the US ter-
ritory of Puerto Rico causing unprecedented damage, leaving residents 
without electricity for nearly a year, deepening an already existing fiscal 
crisis, and bringing about massive social change that many are still 
struggling to understand. Since Hurricane Maria, I have been trying to 
think and write about how this storm ripped the veil off Puerto Rico’s 
colonial status, as much for those observing from afar who had perhaps 
never stopped to contemplate Puerto Rico’s relationship to the United 
States, as well as for local residents who were forced into an affective 
reckoning with the kinds of structural violence they had been enduring 
for decades. 
In this project, I seek to examine how climate change, the shifts 
brought about by the epoch of the Anthropocene, and the gov-
ernmentality of debt with its neoliberal calls for austerity and resilience, 
are all shaped by what some describe as the coloniality of power.1 
Indeed, I ask whether colonialism itself might not be best understood as 
a kind of disaster or, as Nelson Maldonado Torres (2016) suggests, a 
veritable catastrophe. 
This has led me towards an engagement with the large cannon of 
work on “disaster-ology” within the social sciences, which allows me to 
extend a series of already well-established arguments: First, the fact that 
there is no such thing as a natural disaster: all disasters are socially 
produced (Oliver-Smith, Hoffman, & Hoffman, 1999; Wisner, Blaikie, 
Blaikie, Cannon, & Davis, 2004). Second, that disasters should not be 
understood as sudden events, but rather the outcome of long processes of 
slow, structural violence (Carrigan, 2015; Davies, 2018; Kwate & 
Threadcraft, 2018; Nixon, 2011). Thirdly, that “Vulnerability” (both 
social and environmental) is not a natural state but the product of 
racio-colonial governance (Schuller, 2016; Wisner et al., 2004). Lastly, 
that, despite lip service to the contrary, disasters do not operate as “great 
levelers.”; tTheir effects are experienced differentially through 
pre-existing hierarchies of race, class, and gender and in fact they often 
sharpen those relations of inequality (Gómez-Barris, 2017; Nishime & 
Hester Williams, 2018). 
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Given all this, my focus is thus not on what Hurricane Maria has 
caused, but on what it has revealed: namely, how it has laid bare the 
forms of structural violence and racio-colonial governance that had been 
operating in Puerto Rico for centuries.2 
One of the first things Maria revealed is precisely the place of Puerto 
Rico within a broad US archipelago of racialized neglect. This ties it to 
sites of climatic disaster like New Orleans (Giroux, 2007, 2015; Danziger 
& Danziger, 2006; Dyson & Elliott, 2010), but also to places of urban 
ruin and social neglect like Detroit (Desan, 2014; Sugrue, 2014). This in 
turn requires us to interrogate the United States as a racial-imperial 
formation and to critically assess the intertwined nature of racial and 
imperial governance. 
Additionally, Maria reveals the insufficiencies of certain theories of 
“disaster capitalism” that fail to show how it is the “slow violence” of 
colonial and racial governance which sets the stage for the accelerated 
dispossession made evident in a state of emergency (Schuller & Mal-
donado, 2016). That is, the accelerated forms of extraction and dispos-
session evident in the wake of modern disasters are conditioned by the 
subjectivities and technologies of the colonial encounter. For this 
reason, I argue that disaster capitalism needs to be understood as 
foundationally a form of racio-colonial capitalism, that emerges directly 
out of the capitalist incubator of plantation slavery (Beckert, 2015; 
Beckles, 2013; Johnson, 2013; Mintz, 1977, 1985; Williams, 1961).3 
This in turn requires us to question our understandings of 
“resilience, or the ability to absorb and bounce back from experiences 
of shock (Barrios, 2016; Fast & Collin-Vezina, 2010; Kaika, 2017; Mul-
lings, 2005). In recent years, innumerable governmental and interna-
tional agencies have been promoting resilience as a desired state for 
communities and nations. The United Nations and the World Bank have 
numerous campaigns aimed at making cities and communities resilient. 
There are even resilience scorecards that allow governments to measure 
up against international targets and indicators (UNISDR, 2017). 
Following the September 11 attacks, as FEMA fell under the jurisdiction 
of Homeland Security, the idea of resilience has expanded and become 
increasingly tied to the security apparatus, becoming a prescribed 
quality for not just the neoliberal state, but the security state as well 
(Anderson & Adey, 2011; Coaffee, 2008; 2016; Dunn Cavelty, Kauf-
mann, & Søby Kristensen, 2015). This suggests a new ideology in which 
the state is imagined as incapable of eliminating threats—both political 
and environmental—or addressing their causes. Instead, communities 
and individuals must bear the brunt of mitigating rising threats of vio-
lence—both slow/structural and spectacular. 
This push for resiliency must be approached with a great deal of 
caution. We certainly want our buildings and bridges to be resilient, but 
do we really want our communities to become well-adapted to structural 
(and infrastructural) violence? Some see these rising calls for resilience 
as part of the larger dominance of neoliberal forms of governmentality 
across the globe, in which citizenship is increasingly being refashioned 
as individualized self-care. With the increasing cuts in social safety nets, 
all individuals are increasingly being called upon to take on entrepre-
neurial modes of self-care and self-management (Muehlebach, 2012). 
However, we must ask: which communities have historically been 
required to demonstrate resilience and incessantly forced to endure both 
the shocks of neoliberalism and the slow traumatic violence of colonial 
extraction? And is it possible that the push towards resillience has 
actually made them disproportionately vulnerable to the current 
challenges of climate change? 
With these queries in mind, my hope is that ultimately this project 
can help us develop new ways of imagining what recovery might look 
like. That is, if we understand disasters to have deep colonial histories, 
how can we formulate visions of repair that take those longer trajec-
tories into account? How can we develop visions of recovery that do 
notsimply re-establish a previous state of inequity, or prepare pop-
ulations to endure future forms of structural violence, but which instead 
offer substantive forms of transformation and redress? 
This paper is divided into three broad sections. I begin by offering an 
“affective map” of life in Puerto Rico after Maria. Here I give a sense of 
the lived experience of the storm and its aftermath, focusing on the 
temporal logics that transformed a state of emergency into a state of 
endurance (Povinelli, 2011). The second part explores the economic and 
political landscape that set the stage for the storm: how Puerto Rio was 
already in ruins, already prey to vulture, disaster, and imperial capi-
talism, and already a site of increasing calls for neoliberal resilience. The 
final section examines how local residents are trying to reimagine the 
island’s political future in the aftermath of this catastrophic sedimen-
tation and how neoliberal calls for self-reliance converge with 
anti-colonial projects of self-determination. Here I address the dual 
meanings of emergencia as a state of both emergency and emergence. 
2. The wait of disaster 
“If there is only one thing I’ve come to understand about the colonies, my 
dear man, it is that one does nothing here but wait.” – Marlon James, A 
Book of Night Women 
One thread that runs through this essay is an attempt to think about 
what we might call “the temporality of disaster,” or how catastrophic 
events (including colonialism and climate change) impact our experi-
ence of time, progression, social action, and political possibility. I 
approach these questions through the politics of time because one of the 
most striking things about the aftermath of hurricane Maria in Puerto 
Rico was how it operated as a moment of temporal rupture. In the im-
mediate aftermath of the storm, residents felt trapped in a state of sus-
pension. For weeks on end, there was no school, no work, no electricity, 
no phone service, no internet, no television, and no public services. With 
hospitals closed or only able to treat the most critically ill, sick patients 
were sent home unable to receive services such as cancer treatments or 
dialysis. Without electricity, funeral homes were unable to embalm the 
dead. (Although given the impassable roads, some are said to have 
buried the dead in their own backyards.) For weeks on end, roads 
remained blocked; food, water, and gasoline were scarce, and cell phone 
towers were down rendering most phones inoperable. 
I’ve written about temporal ruptures like this before, particularly in 
my work about labor strikes in the French Caribbean (Bonilla, 2015). 
There I looked at how social movements—like general strikes, hunger 
strikes, or political encampments—create breaks in quotidian routines, 
providing liminal moments of temporal suspension in which new futures 
can become imaginable. However, the temporality of a social movement 
is quite different from that of a disaster. In the context of social move-
ments, the present seems to expand in the sense that it becomes overly 
eventful. Social movements are known to produce a kind of sped-up 
time. As Lenin famously noted, there are decades where nothing hap-
pens, and then there are weeks where decades happen. 
The temporal mode of emergency also comes with a heightened state 
of awareness, a surge of adrenaline, a perceived need to move fast, to act 
quick, to fix, to save, to repair, to restore. This in turn creates the 
expectation of change: a desire and perceived need to move out of the 
present state. That is, there is an assumption that the temporal mode of 
emergency will be fleeting, quickly shifting over into that of recovery. 
2 Although little remarked upon, Hurricane Maria passed through Puerto Rico 
precisely on the 100th anniversary of the extension of US citizenship to local 
residents.  
3 For more on the notion of racial capitalism see Robinson (2019). I use the 
term racio-colonial capitalism to stress the co-constitutive nature of race and 
colonialism and foreground the importance of conquest and colonial outposts 
for the development of modern capitalism. (For more see Walter Rodney (2018) 
and Eric Williams (1961). 
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Emergency is not expected to be an enduring state.4 
However, in post hurricane Puerto Rico, this feeling of urgency was 
met with a crushing wall of inaction. The present did not expand in its 
eventfulness, but in its persistence. Time passed, and nothing changed. 
Gone was what Reinhardt Kosselleck (2004) once described as the 
“otherness of the future.” The present no longer felt ephemeral, quickly 
dissolving into something new. Instead, the present lingered longer than 
it should. This created a frenzied state of repetition in which each day 
felt eerily like the last. Indeed, as one woman I interviewed in the town 
of Comerío—who had spent the previous four months fighting with 
FEMA to get a tarp on her roofless home—told me, if anything, each day 
felt worse. 
What characterized life after Maria thus was not progress but delay, 
deterioration, degradation, and the forced act of waiting. Before the 
storm hit, residents waited for María itself. They stockpiled provisions, 
gathered those they called family, took stock of what they held dear, and 
prepared themselves for the worst. Then, for nearly 24 h rain beat down 
steadily on fragile homes, water poured in through windows and leaky 
roofs, gusts of wind ripped windows straight off their hinges, and rivers 
spilled out of their banks pushing residents onto their rooftops in search 
of safety. Many of those I’ve interviewed spent the entire storm holding 
on to a door that Maria seemed intent on ripping away. Some had to 
leave their flooding homes mid-storm and wade through chest-deep 
waters to find safety. Others have children who still wake up in the 
middle of the night afraid that they or their parents might be drowning. 
Those of us in the diaspora went through our own process of sus-
pension. We held our breath from across the ocean. We heard the 
howling winds through phone lines and social media posts. We felt the 
lights go out and the cell towers drop. And we panicked when suddenly 
our loved ones fell out of digital reach. 
Everyone waited for the storm to pass, thinking foolishly that the 
winds and rain would be the worst of it. We didn’t realize that the true 
disaster was not the storm itself, but what was laid bare in its wake: the 
neglected infrastructure of an island in crisis, the economic cleavages of 
a society marked by profound disparity, the naked disdain of an imperial 
state, and the forms of structural neglect and social abandonment that 
had already come to characterize this bankrupt colony. 
After the winds subsided, residents once again waited for roads to be 
cleared, for the lights to come back on, for stores to re-open, for cell 
phone service to return and for running water to be restored. They 
endured long lines that lastedanywhere from six to 8 h to obtain basic 
necessities such as: food, fuel, water, and the ice needed to refrigerate 
life-saving medications such as insulin. Without electricity or commu-
nication services, merchants were unable to accept credit cards or public 
assistance payments. Thus, some of the longest lines were at the bank, 
where residents waited to procure the cash needed to purchase what few 
items were available in stores. For those without savings, many of whom 
had not received income since the first of the two back-to-back storms it 
was impossible to participate in the hurricane economy—they, most of 
all, were left to wait. 
For those who lost their homes, there was no line, just the labyrinth 
of bureaucracy. They were told to sign up for FEMA assistance online, 
which was impossible for most since they had no electricity, internet, or 
cell phone service. Once they figured out how to fill out their paperwork, 
they were then told to wait in their destroyed homes without cleaning or 
repairing the damage, dwelling in disaster until the fabled FEMA in-
spectors could come to calculate their loss. 
The wait reinforced the feeling of insularity. Those inside felt trap-
ped. They ambled around holding their phones to the sky searching for a 
signal so they could let the world know that they had survived and that 
they were “okay,” even though what it meant to be “okay” in post-Maria 
Puerto Rico was unclear. For some, being “okay” meant they didn’t have 
electricity or running water. For others, it meant they lost their roofs but 
not their homes. For many it meant they lost everything but their lives. 
Those too sick, too old, too young, or too impatient to weather this 
period—or those for whom Puerto Rico still be homeland but not nec-
essarilyhome—headed to the airport in record numbers, often aban-
doning their cars in the parking lot, keys and all, for the bank to 
repossess. 
Many residents expressed frustration with this sense of stalled time. 
The halt of capitalist flows and the halt of modernity suddenly made it 
clear that Puerto Rico was one of those islands. Puerto Ricans had long 
imagined that long lines, shortages, rationing, and a dependency on the 
diaspora were things experienced elsewhere. It was believed that US-led 
development had raised Puerto Rico above the standard of living of its 
Caribbean neighbors. Many thought that being a US citizen meant not 
having to stand in line for food or going to a river for water. 
Thus, the first couple of days everyone waited patiently, grateful to 
be alive and understanding that bouncing back from a disaster takes 
time, but feeling confident that the government had an emergency plan 
in motion. That is, there was an assumption that the temporal mode of 
emergency would quickly shift over into that of recovery. 
But the cavalry never arrived. Government trucks did not turn up to 
clear the debris. Instead, neighbors had to clear their own paths with 
machetes. Tankers of drinking water didn’t appear, so residents headed 
to the river with buckets, or built their own make-shift infrastructure out 
of PVC pipes that connected directly to mountain springs. 
They drank rain water or opened up wells that were later revealed to 
be toxic (Hernandez & Dennis, 2017). Food was not delivered for weeks, 
so community kitchens sprung up, sometimes feeding a single block, 
sometimes feeding half the town. For weeks on end, there were no aid 
workers, no helicopters, no military hospitals, no distribution centers. 
The state simply left its citizens waiting. When government aid finally 
arrived, it was a slow and insufficient trickle with none of the “shock and 
awe” that many had come to associate with the “most powerful military 
in the world.” Meal boxes distributed by the federal government offered 
merely a can of sausages and a bag of skittles. This and an infamous roll 
of paper towels hurled by the president, stood in sharp contrast to the 
imagined bounty of empire. 
The Diaspora agonized over this delay, this immobility, this impo-
tence. New migrants talked about having survivor’s guilt, feeling like 
they had abandoned ship. They combed news and internet feeds for 
traces of their communities. Multiple online groups were created for 
keeping track of reports from different parts of the island.If people 
couldn’t hear from their loved ones directly, they could at least console 
themselves by finding out if the bridge to their town was still standing, 
or if anyone from their neighborhood had shown proof of life. 
With government aid indefinitely stalled, those on the outside took it 
upon themselves to lead the recovery. Before post offices had even 
opened, they began filling care boxes. They strategized on social media 
about the best way to send items, calculating how many cans of food 
could fit in a flat rate box, and wondering if it was possible to mail a 
gallon of water. A young woman I met at a university event described the 
feeling as one of catatonia: a mental state marked by purposeless ac-
tivity, immobility, and stupor.5 
Many of those who were able to survive the storm were lost to its 
wake. They succumbed to what anthropologist Michel-Rolph Trouillot 
once described as “ordinary accidents and ordinary diseases”—so ordi-
nary that anywhere else they would have been treated or altogether 
avoided (Trouillot, 1990). They contracted banal diseases like 
conjunctivitis due to lack of sanitation, and more deadly ones produced 
by the presence of animal corpses in rivers and rat droppings amongst 
the debris (Sosa Pascual & Sutter, 2018; Sutter 2018b). Some were run 
4 For more on emergency as a “mode of eventfulness” see Anderson (2015, 
2017), Berlant (2011) and Choi (2015). 
5 In the months following Maria, a new podcast named Catatonia was 
developed by journalist and artist Huascar Robles to discuss precisely these 
issues. https://www.huascarrobles.com/catatonia. 
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over in the night by cars due to the lack of street lights, others were 
killed in accidents at intersections without traffic signals. Others, who 
suffered from sleep apnea, choked in the night because electricity could 
no longer power their CPAP machines (Sutter 2018a). 
Surgeons operated by the light of their cellphones (Cummins, 2017). 
With hospitals overrun or closed, home births rates increased, but so did 
suicides (Acevedo, 2018; Liautaud, Giraldo, & x Paoli, 2017). One 
woman who tried to take her own life left a final Facebook post com-
menting on the public demand for strength and resilience: “We’re so 
obsessed with strength,” she wrote, “We’re told we have to be strong, 
resilient, and what not and we believe it.” She signed off by posting a 
YouTube video of Sting singing “Fragile.” 
At one point, people thought that what was needed in Puerto Rico 
was more media coverage. But the media came. They documented. They 
managed to keep the story alive. Puerto Rico was featured in news re-
ports to an unprecedented degree, but this made no difference. The 
suffering continued. It wasn’t a secret; it was a public display. Even 
reporters from US news outlets felt as if they were trapped in a state of 
suspension and repetition. CBS News reporter David Begnaud said to his 
anchor, “I’ve never covered a natural disaster where the emergency was 
endless” (Begnaud, 2017). 
Nearly two years later, the social landscape remains stubbornly un-
changed. The leaves that were ripped off trees by hurricane winds have 
now grown back, and the environmental ravages of the storm have 
started to fade, but infrastructure remains in shatters. Most buildings 
look battered: the violence of the hurricane winds chipped away their 
paint, shattered their windows, and blew off their facades. Even fast food 
restaurants have only empty poles where their signs used to be. Unre-
paired windows remain boarded up, other buildings are completely 
abandoned. Electric cables still dangle perilously in the air, mere inches 
from the cars passing beneath them. Utility poles still litter the ground 
like forgotten corpses, or lean precariously against homes as vegetation 
grows around them. Over a year after the storm, an estimated 60% of 
traffic lights are still not working. Most public lighting remains out of 
service, and throughout local towns an enduring feeling of abandonment 
and ruin prevails. 
Residents have become accustomed to this landscape. They’ve 
become adept at circumventing the power lines and debris that still 
surround their homes, and they’ve figured out how to deftly maneuver 
intersections without traffic lights. At a crossroads in Guaynabo, a road 
sign popped up (see Fig. 1) showing a broken streetlight. It’s telling that 
I witnessed heated debate and speculation at a dinner table over whether 
this was an artistic statement or an actual government-produced sign. In 
other words, some were willing to entertain the idea that the govern-
ment might never repair the traffic system, and would instead simply 
create a new iconography of disaster. 
Well-meaning observers speculate: would this happen in a US state? 
The answer is Yes. The answer is Flint, where austerity measures led to a 
poisoned water supply that has yet to be remedied. Indeed, to under-
stand Puerto Rico, we must place it within this larger archipelago of 
racialized neglect, connected through deep currents of racialized 
governance (Meyers & Hunt, 2014). Just as police brutality runs on a 
loop in the US via cell phone videos of police assault and murder, so do 
images of neglected populations: abandoned urban spaces in Detroit, 
poisoned water reserves in Flint, displaced communities in New Orleans, 
and Puerto Ricans left to wait on rooftops for aid that refuses to arrive. 
(See Fig. 2) These are not mistakes or even events. rThese are the logics 
of disposability at work. As Christina Sharpe asserts, this is the weather, 
the total climate, an environment in which black and brown bodies are 
rendered disposable (Sharpe, 2016). 
Those who were quick to assert indignantly “But these are US citi-
zens!” seemed to forget that citizenship does not save you. Citizenship 
doesn’t mean you won’t be shot dead in plain daylight by a police of-
ficer, or left abandoned without food or water for days on end—on a 
rooftop, at a superdome, in a prison cell, or in a flood zone. It is precisely 
the second class citizenship that Puerto Ricans have long 
experienced—the legal categories in which they have been purposefully 
placed through the technologies of racio-colonial governance—which 
ensures that for years on end Puerto Ricans will continue to wait under 
blue tarps, much like residents of New Orleans waited in FEMA trailers, 
pushed to the limits of bureaucratic exhaustion. This is not the result of 
failed inclusion, but of successful occupation. 
Sociologist Javier Auyero suggests that waiting is a temporal process 
through which political subordination is produced (Auyero, 2012). He 
argues that recipients of government assistance are often made to wait 
days, months, even years for the bureaucratic machinery of state assis-
tance. Auyero shows how temporal delay operates as a governmental 
technique and an assertion of state power. However, as some anthro-
pologists have suggested, waiting also implies the existence of a certain 
horizon of expectation, a faith in the chances of an arrival (Hage, 2009; 
Janeja & Bandak, 2018). Waiting (esperar) implies hope (esperanza). It 
involves anticipation, a form of thinking and living towards the future 
(Adams, Murphy, & Clarke, 2009). But what happens when you stop 
waiting? What happens when you give up? 
In Puerto Rico at present many have given up by taking their own 
lives, or by getting on a plane, but you also have those who have given 
up on the government by individually taking on the task of recovery: 
clearing roads, setting up community kitchens, delivering aid to 
forgotten residents, building roofs, and even directing traffic at 
intersections. 
One of the popular hashtags that emerged in the storm’s wake to 
highlight these efforts was #Puerto Rico Se Levanta (Puerto RicoRises). 
The slogan was first used by the Puerto Rican government to inform the 
public about the Post-Irma recovery process, along with stylized 
Fig. 1. Street sign in Puerto Rico. Photo by author.  
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graphics detailing recovery efforts on social media6. In these govern-
ment posts, #PuertoRicoSeLevanta represented an assertion of govern-
mental efficiency and care at a time of crisis. 
However, after Hurricane Maria there was no government. The head 
of emergency management made a statement to the press asking citizens 
to stay calm and wait because there was no working government, and 
there wouldn’t be for several days. (Shortly afterwards he went on 
vacation.) For days on end, there was no communication between the 
central offices in San Juan and the different towns throughout Puerto 
Rico. For months, there was little progress or accountability about how 
and when state aid would arrive. Residents and local mayors were left in 
limbo, forced to sort things out on their own. 
During this period, the hashtag #PuertoRicoSeLevanta morphed 
from an assertion of governmental care, to a demonstration of individual 
resilience. With this shift, the meaning of "Puerto Rico" in #Puerto Rico 
Se Levanta was transfromed from indexing a state apparatus to signaling 
a body politic forced to self rely in the absence of the state. The slogan 
was subsequently used to show images of residents coming together with 
their neighbors and finding creative solutions to the lack of infrastruc-
ture, such as building washing machines out of bicycle parts or gener-
ators out of lawnmowers. Some of these posts showed residents taking 
on government roles such as setting up centros de acopio (aid centers), 
delivering food and water to rural areas, and taking charge of 
intersections that lacked working traffic lights. In other words, the 
hashtag was used to show how residents were stepping into the roles of 
an absent state. 
They say it takes twenty-one days for new habits to cement. The great 
majority of Puerto Ricans spent well over a hundred days without 
electricity, running water, or traffic signals — that is, without the 
invisible infrastructure of daily life.7 Feeling abandoned by the gov-
ernment became habitual. Being forced to self-rely became ingrained. 
Many have celebrated Puerto Rican’s resilience in the aftermath of the 
storm, indeed, it’s quite remarkable that there was so little violence, 
looting, or unrest. However, one must wonder: what will these 
increasingly individualized and privatized form of resilience and self- 
reliance produce in a place that was already bracing itself for auster-
ity? At what point does resilience become a form of neoliberal 
endurance? 
3. Bankrupt states and resilient individuals 
It is important to remember that the 2017 storms arrived just two 
years after the previous Governor of Puerto Rico had declared that this 
US territory was on the verge of a financial “death spiral” (Walsh, 2016). 
Years of overborrowing to compensate for a deflated economic base had 
led to a multi-billiondollar debt, which the state was now incapable of 
Fig. 2. Tweet comparing Puerto Rico to new orleans.  
6 For an example of these kinds of posts see https://twitter.com/fortalezapr/s 
tatus/906223691792617477 
7 As Starr and Bowker (1995) argue, infrastructure is often invisible until it 
breaks or fails. See also Cowen (2017) on the infastructure of empire. 
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servicing. 
The local government tried to file for bankruptcy, but Puerto Rico 
was mysteriously written out of the bankruptcy law by an unexplained 
1984 amendment to the tax code (Greenberg, 2016; Lubben, 2014). 
Puerto Rico’s territorial status thus leaves its municipalities unable to 
declare bankruptcy—a right only afforded within the 50 states. It is also 
unable to follow the path of sovereign nations like Argentina by 
defaulting because it is written into the territorial constitution that 
government debts must be serviced before any other public 
expenditures. 
This dates back to the moment when Congress established Puerto 
Rico’s civil government in 1917 (after nearly two decades of military 
rule). At that point, it decreed that any bonds issued by its government 
would be free from taxation. Later, in 1952, when the United States 
convinced the United Nations to remove Puerto Rico from the list of non 
self-governing societies, it was written into the island’s new constitution 
that the repayment of public debt must take priority over financing 
public services. In other words, one of the founding principles of terri-
torial status was its establishment as a site of US investment and Puerto 
Rican debt. 
When Puerto Rico’s commonwealth status was established, it was 
portrayed as a temporary measure. Its proponent, Luis Mu~noz Marín, 
suggested that the territory needed time to industrialize and strengthen 
its economy in order to either become a US state or develop as an in-
dependent nation. However, here too residents were left waiting. The 
industrialization efforts that followed did not succeed in elevating the 
island’s economy to the level of a US state. Even before the hurricane, 
Puerto Rico’s gross national income was roughly one third the level of 
the fifty states and close to 45% of the population lived at or below the 
poverty line. 
The causes of the current economic crisis are complex. In many ways 
it is linked to the larger financial crisis of 2008, but it was also precip-
itated by the elimination of tax incentives to US businesses during the 
Clinton administration in 1993.8 This led to a massive loss of revenue as 
manufacturers moved to sites with lower operational costs. As manu-
facturers moved away, so too did the military, which closed most of the 
bases on the island causing even greater economic compression. The 
latter was a clear indication of the loss of Puerto Rico’s geopolitical 
importance in the wake of the Cold War. It’s is telling that at the same 
time that the Obama administration refused to offer a financial package 
to address Puerto Rico’s economic crisis, they sought to re-establish 
diplomatic ties with the Cuban government. 
Puerto Rico’s debt crisis was also fueled by the particular financial 
apparatus that are Puerto Rican bonds, and the role they played in the 
global financial crisis. In addition to having constitutionally guaranteed 
repayment terms, bonds issued by the Puerto Rican government also 
have the unique and singular quality (unavailable within any of the 50 
states) of being triple tax exempt, which makes them free of tax obli-
gations at the state, federal, or local level (Walsh, 2015). This made 
them irresistible to Wall Street financiers, who kept finding new and 
creative ways of re-packaging what had clearly become a shell game. In 
fact, it was the Lehman Brothers firm (before its crash) which helped 
establish the island’s sales tax system in 2016 as a way of skirting 
constitutional limits on public debt.9 
As a result, Puerto Rico accrued an unfathomable amount of public 
debt. As its ability to service that debt came into question, the loan terms 
became less and less favorable—resulting in what some describe as the 
societal equivalent of a payday loan. Most of its Capital Appreciation 
bonds, for example, have an effective interest rate of 785% (Bhatti & 
Sloan, 2016). 
Numerous civic groups have called for the cancellation of the debt, or 
at the very least its audit. The local government petitioned for the right 
to declare bankruptcy, but instead Congress passed the 2016 Puerto Rico 
Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA), which 
allowed restructuring under the control of a congressionally-appointed 
Oversight Boardlocally referred to as “La Junta,” which was charged 
with shrinking the local government’s budget through the imple-
mentation of austerity measures and the reduction of public services. 
Many compare these austerity measures to those imposed elsewhere, 
such as in Greece. However, in the Greek case, austerity measures rep-
resented a pre-condition for the extension of a larger aid package, 
whereas in Puerto Rico austerity was implemented with no accompa-
nying assistance. The PROMESA law did not provide any transfer of 
funds from the federal government. If anything, it imposed a new eco-
nomic burden on the Puerto Rican government which subsequently had 
to pay the board’s overhead— to the tune of over $200 million dollars a 
year. 
As with emergency boards that have been put into place in other 
racialized and indebted societies such as Detroit and Flint, the board’s 
main task has been to shrink the state apparatus, which has meant 
closing schools, consolidating agencies, suspending public services, and 
privatizing public infrastructure (such as airports, highways, and utility 
systems), all while raising the sales tax and government fees. As 
mentioned above, Puerto Rico didn’t even have a sales tax before 2006. 
By 2017 it reached 11.5%–the highest of any US state or territory. These 
revenues however are earmarked for debt repayment, not maintenance 
of public services. 
The debt crisis thus paved the way for infrastructural vulnerability 
and social abandonment long before hurricane María. For example, the 
electric grid had not received proper maintenance. Just a year prior to 
Maria, there had been an island-wide three day blackout that demon-
strated the weakness of the grid (Stanchich, 2016). The water system 
was also in crisis. A report from May of 2017 showed that 70% of the 
island’s drinking water was possibly toxic (Llorens & Stanchich, 2019; 
Cotto, 2017). A report on the hospital system had also tried to sound the 
alarm about the inability of the health system to respond in case of a 
crisis (Gonzalez, 2018). We now know that it was these infrastructural 
failures which led to Maria’s high death toll—estimated to be some-
where between three and five thousand (Sosa Pascual et al., 2018; Sosa 
Pascual et al., 2019). This makes Hurricane Maria the deadliest disaster 
on US soil in recent history, withan even higher death toll than 9/11. 
Puerto Rico’s ongoing crisis had also spurred a historic migratory 
wave even before the hurricane hit, with more Puerto Ricans already 
residing in the continental United States than in the Puerto Rican ter-
ritory (Cohn, Patten, & Lopez, 2014). It is clear that many of those 
evacuating are not imagining a return, not imagining a collective future, 
just an extended state of emergency. 
While migration rates continue to climb, the current government has 
been focused on attracting new “stakeholders” to come to Puerto Rico 
under Act 20/22, a pivotal piece of legislation that allows wealthy elites 
from the states to use Puerto Rico as a tax haven (Neate, 2016). Passed in 
2012, the legislation was established to bring capital investment to the 
island once it was barred from borrowing. The law originally carried 
certain restrictions requiring direct capital investment and job creation. 
Under the current administration, however, these rules have been lifted. 
Now, any new transplant from the US who spends half the year on the 
island can receive exemptions from federal and local taxes, capital gains 
tax, and taxes on passive income until the year 2035, regardless of 
whether they generate employment or invest in the local economy 
(Bonilla, 2018). This makes Puerto Rico the only place on US soil where 
such income can go untaxed. (Of course, this is only available to “new 
arrivals” not current residents or those originally born in the territory 
who have since migrated.) 
Originally designed to attract wealthy financiers, the law has ended 
up luring tech entrepreneurs, cryptocurrency devotees, digital nomads, 
8 For critical resources on the background and social implications of the debt 
crisis, see www.puertoricosyllabus.com.  
9 A portion of the newly created sales tax (now at 11.5%) would be used to 
securitize new bonds that won’t be counted as part of the money borrowed by 
the government (Scahill, 2018). 
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and tax dodgers who choose their countries of residence based on eco-
nomic incentives, regulatory freedom, and “value opportunities,” rather 
than on cultural or political ties. 
Puerto Rico’s status as an unincorporated US territory suits these 
untethered entrepreneurs. Since Puerto Rico is neither a nation nor a US 
state, new arrivals are able to retain their US citizenship while opting out 
of tax obligations. One of these wealthy part-time residents, Peter Schiff, 
the CEO of Euro Pacific Capital, was quoted by CNN as saying “Yeah, I’m 
saving a lot of money … It’s the closest thing to renouncing your US 
citizenship without actually doing it … You’re still an American, you’re 
just out from under the IRS" (Gillespie, 2015). In a recent GQ magazine 
article, another recent arrival justified his decision similarly. He ex-
plains, “I was looking at different tax havens: Andorra, Lichtenstein, 
Monaco. But the problem is, you have to give up your US passport. When 
I heard about this, it was too good to be true. But it’s real. I live in 
paradise. I live at the Ritz-Carlton. I drive my golf cart to the beach club 
for breakfast. Then I go to my sunset yoga class on the beach” (Barron, 
2018). 
Some argue that these new arrivals will offer a much-needed boost to 
the local economy, however these self-described “ex-pats” tend to live in 
isolated enclaves, and even then for only part of the year— carefully 
avoiding hurricane season, for example. They provide little in the way of 
long-term, secure employment, particularly as the majority of those 
arriving are part of what the governor describes as members of the 
“human cloud”—untethered digital nomads who can set up shop any-
where because they require little local infrastructure (Bonilla, 2018). It 
is this disregard for social infrastructure, combined with a broader lib-
ertarian ideology that scorns the state apparatus, which makes Puerto 
Rico such an attractive destination for these digital nomads. Unlike 
long-term residents, these new arrivals are not concerned with the 
withering capacities of an already moribund and bankrupt 
non-sovereign local state. For them, state retreat is strategically useful. 
By claiming Puerto Rico as their primary residence, these new ar-
rivals lose the right to vote in US presidential or congressional elections, 
but when asked about this, they seem unconcerned. One new arrival 
quoted in a GQ article said he didn’t care about voting: “We’ve got a civil 
war going on. Red versus blue. We’ve got four percent unemployment, 
and I feel safer being here than in Miami or New York. The world’s going 
to shit, and that doesn’t mean Puerto Rico won’t go down further. They 
are already way down.” In other words, Puerto Rico has already been 
forced to deal with the precarity, disparity, and increased vulnerability 
that is forecasted for the world as a whole in the age of the Anthro-
pocene. While some experience disasters as triggers of dispossession, 
others spout ideals of “Anti-Fragility” seeing moments of crisis—both 
environmental and economic—as possibilities for creative destruction 
(Taleb, 2012). 
Some argue that climate change will serve as a great leveler and that 
it could bring about greater social consciousness around the globe. 
However, reports have shown that although the “super rich” are highly 
concerned about apocalyptic futures and an impending class war, they 
are not preparing for these scenarios by investing in social infrastruc-
ture, but rather by generating individualized doomsday survival stra-
tegies through the construction of stealth bunkers and the exploration of 
space travel (Osnos, 2017; O’Connell, 2018). In the Caribbean, this re-
sults in self-sufficient mansions complete with solar panels, water 
desalination plants, helipads, and massive emergency supplies—none of 
which require a functioning state. Given the fantasies that continue to 
circulate about remote and uninhabited deserted isles, it is perhaps not 
surprising that tropical islands would become a fantasy scenario for an 
apocalyptic future. 
I once asked one of these wealthy expats how he felt about moving 
and doing business in a place with unreliable public services, spotty 
internet, and frequent power outages. He responded immediately that he 
lives in Condado—the most expensive enclave of San Juan—where the 
internet is faster than Silicon Valley, and all the buildings have under-
ground electric cabling and reserve water tanks. He also stressed that the 
hardships experienced after María had strengthened his resolve to move 
here. The ability with which Puerto Ricans were able to carry on with 
little protest or violence in the face of disaster—in other words their 
resilience—had convinced him that this was a safe place to ride out 
future storms. 
It is concerning that the local government views these groups as 
important new “stakeholders” in Puerto Rico’s future and has created 
advisory groups and other official channels to involve them in the 
articulation of Puerto Rico’s recovery. At a time when the government 
was already reducing public services and enacting austerity measures 
that disproportionately impact the poor, these new constituents could 
help tip the scales towards a recovery that centers on “individual re-
sponsibility” at the same time that local populations are left without 
collective safety nets. 
While the local government tries to lure new wealthy non-Puerto 
Ricans to the island, it simultaneously continues to increase austerity 
measures for locals. One of the first measures passed by the Rossello 
administration was a labor reform act that eliminated sick days, 
extended the probationary period, and allowed workers to be paid less 
than minimum wage. These reforms are a response to arguments made 
by certain economic analyssts, such as a writer for Forbes who had 
suggested that Puerto Rico’s problem was that it had applied “rich 
country policies” to a poor society (Sotomayor, 2015). In other words, 
the writer suggests that Puerto Ricans took their US citizenship too 
literally and imagined they were entitled to the same kind of infra-
structure and living standards of a US state. 
The debt crisis that preceded the hurricane had already began to shift 
expectations about what it meant to be a US citizen in Puerto Rico, what 
economic rights you were entitled to, what services you should expect to 
receive from the state, and what kind of political futures were imagin-
able in a bankrupt colony. Although the semblance of a benefactor state 
remained alive through federal programs such as Pell grants and food 
stamps, the local government was no longer seen as capable of pro-
tecting its citizens by offering them a safety net or even basic services. As 
a result, preparing yourself for things such as a natural disaster had 
increasingly come to be seen as an individual duty, not a state 
responsibility. 
As one man I interviewed explained, 
“We have to change that attitude that the government has to provide 
for us, because we will never get back on our feet that way. Here we 
depend too much on the government and the government is bank-
rupt. The government doesn’t work. So now we have to work harder 
because the government can no longer help us.” (Research Interview 
June 2017) 
Many I’ve interviewed emphasized this idea that it was up to in-
dividuals to prepare for the storm. They had to fill their gas tanks, 
stockpile food and water, and withdraw money from the bank before the 
storm hit. Some even considered it irresponsible, given Puerto Rico’s 
decaying infrastructure, to lack a home generator or solar panels.10 
What is absent from this narrative is the fact that for many hurricane 
preparedness had become impossible. The debt crisis had left in-
dividuals in a deep state of vulnerability, that was both societal, (in 
terms of fragile infrastructure) as well as personal (in terms of financial 
precarity) at the precise moment they were being called upon to act as 
agents of their own recovery. I was struck by the irony of all of this as I 
stumbled upon a banner in front of one of Puerto Rico’s banks which 
declared “Un nuevo Puerto Rico esta en uno,” meaning that a new Puerto 
Rico lies within each individual. On the one hand, the slogan emphasizes 
the importance of individualized recovery, on the other hand it also 
10 Indeed, a year after Maria the hashtag #AUnA~noDeMaría [#OneYear-
AfterMaria] went viral on Twitter with dark satirical takes on these discourses, 
mocking those who suggested that a year after Maria you were irresponsible 
citizen if you didn’t have these items. 
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suggests that the future of Puerto Rico is already here, already gestating 
within its residents. 
3.1. From self-reliance to self determination 
“They want everything to be done for them when it should be a community 
effort.” 
– Donald Trump, Twitter. 
In the weeks after hurricane Maria, there was a great deal of outrage 
over a statement Donald Trump made on Twitter about Puerto Rico. In 
response to the Mayor of San Juan’s critiques of federal efforts, he said 
that Puerto Ricans wanted everything done for them. He came under fire 
with good reason. However, as is often the case with Trump, his words 
spoke to broader shared expectations, not just about the distribution of 
state resources, but also about disaster recovery and its agents. 
As mentioned above, in the days following the storm, the slogan 
“Puerto Rico se levanta” went viral on social media and in real life. It was 
spray-painted on battered buildings, and written onto cars, often 
accompanied by the Puerto Rican flag, which was suddenly everywhere. 
It’s interesting to contrast this with the role played by national flags in 
other disaster landscapes. In New Orleans, for example, US flags were 
raised as calls for help, but also as public reminders of residents’ enti-
tlement to government aid. The Puerto Rican flags that emerged after 
the hurricane, however, were not calling for government assistance, but 
rather asserting that citizens didn’t need the government in order to 
move forward. When I asked one local schoolteacher about his decision 
to place a flag above his home, he explained, “Those of us who raise the 
Puerto Rican flags are saying we can do it on our own]. We can raise 
ourselves on our own. We are the protagonists of our recovery.” 
The Puerto Rican flag has always been a symbol of independence. It 
was once seen as subversive and was censured but later became 
commodified and was channeled into a form of cultural nationalism that 
co-exists with the US presence on the island (Davila, 1997). It is thus not 
surprising that businesses quickly began incorporating the flag and the 
slogan "Puerto Rico se levanta" into their publicity ads. The Medalla beer 
company issued a new Puerto Rico “restart” can for its products. Bill-
boards promoting pain relief medicine declared that small pains would 
not stop Puerto Rico from rebuilding and hip boutiques in the tourist 
enclave of Condado exhibited the slogan on store windows, along with 
displays of expensive clothing ill-suited for the hard work of digging 
yourself out of a flood. You could also purchase a Puerto Rico se levanta 
souvenir t-shirt or baseball cap at the airport, and I even discovered a 
Puerto Rico se levanta series of Hallmark cards at a local Walgreens (See 
Figs. 3 and 4). The greeting cards included notes thanking the receiver 
for acts of kindness, encouraging the reader to stay positive in the face of 
difficulty, and calls for collective unity. 
For some, the overwhelming presence of nationalist affect in the 
wake of the disaster might seem like an assertion of independence in the 
face of imperial neglect. One can also view it as the cooptation of col-
lective sentiment in the service of a neoliberal recovery. This is similar to 
the role of volunteerist affect that Vincanne Adams (2013) saw under-
pinning the New Orleans recovery and which others have also described 
as key to the production of neoliberal state retreat (Muehlebach, 2012). 
It is interesting that "Puerto Rico se levanta" is a double entendre—it 
could mean that Puerto Rico is getting back on its feet, but it could also 
mean that Puerto Rico is having an uprising. The fact that this latter 
meaning was so little discussed or rallied, shows how seemingly depo-
liticized the recovery efforts were. Even though some residents spent 
nearly a year without electricity, there were very few protests or dem-
onstrations. Some communities placed banners outside their neighbor-
hoods simply noting the fact that they still didn’t have electricity. Others 
held torch-lit processions to call attention to their plight. Interestingly, 
none of these actions were held in front of state agencies or sites of 
governmental power. Instead, communities mostly turned inward. In the 
town of Quebradillas, residents managed to bring the freeway to a 
standstill during a protest, refusing to let business carry on as usual. Yet, 
the slogan for their demonstration “Tratamos de Levantarnos” (We are 
trying to get up) seems almost apologetic, suggesting that they bore the 
responsibility of raising themselves up from their plight even as the state 
failed to provide even the most basic services (Cyber News, 2017). 
As stated previously, in the initial aftermath of the storm, many 
Puerto Ricans came together to set up community kitchens, organize 
solidarity brigades, clean up debris, place tarps on roofless homes, 
distribute solar lights, and take charge, if not of the recovery, at least of 
the emergency in the face of an absent state. Some examples of these 
kinds of organizations include Casa Pueblo, an organization that 
emerged from 1980s environmental activism around the town of 
Adjuntas (Massol Deya, 2018). Long before Maria, Casa Pueblo was 
promoting solar energy, sustainable development, and self-sufficiency 
through a well-established network and protocol of community action. 
Another example is Comedores Sociales, an initiative that emerged out 
of the 2010 university strike and the Pre-Maria protests against the 
Fiscal Control Board and in favor of auditing the debt (Roberto, 2019). 
Additionally, new groups spontaneously emerged to fill in the gaps left 
by absentee state agencies. Some of these were temporary solidarity 
brigades, but others became new non-profit organizations that continue 
to operate and serve their communities years after Maria. 
These efforts are reminiscent of the maroon politics that long char-
acterized Caribbean societies in which parallel communities developed 
on the margins of the colonial state. They also echo projects forged by 
diasporic communities throughout the US. This inlcudes the breakfast 
programs, health and education services developed by groups like the 
Black Panthers, the Young Lords, and the Brown Berets, which were 
themselves in dialogue with indigenous groups and other communities 
struggling against internal colonialism. As well as contemporary forms 
Fig. 3. "Puerto Rico se levanta" greeting cards. Photo by Author.  
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of "DIY urbanism" that have developed in places that have also been 
abandoned by the state, such as Detroit (Kinder, 2016). All these efforts 
reflect contexts in which the state has never been a site of political 
guarantees, but of exploitation at worst and abandonment at best. In the 
colonial context of Puerto Rico, these initiatives represent the search for 
an alternative form of sovereignty. That is, going off the grid or engaging 
in self-reliance in the context of contemporary Puerto Rico becomes a 
broader kind of freedom project that sees self-sufficiency and commu-
nity care as a possible way of breaking with US dependence 
(Massol-Deya, 2019; 2020). 
These emerging initiatives are small and localized. They are not 
territory-wide, instead they are each tied to particular constituencies or 
municipalities and are not necessarily interested in carrying out what in 
a different era one would call a mass movement. For some observers 
there is something frustrating about this because their efforts don’t look 
like a modernist political project. That is, they do not constitute what 
anthropologist James Scott would describe as an effort to “see like a 
state” or think like a state (Scott, 1998). In other words, they do not 
resemble a modernist nation building movement. 
These various efforts are often described through the concept of 
autogestion, which before Maria had already become a watchword in 
Puerto Rico. Particularly in thewake of the debt crisis, it had become 
common to hear people talk about the need to autogestionarse. Taken 
literally, autogestion can be translated as self-reliance or self-manage-
ment\.11 Yet, gestionar can have a different meaning, not just of man-
agement but of gestation (like a fetus), that is, it can be imagined as the 
process of incubating and developing a new being. 
At a post-Maria event at the University of Puerto Rico, local scholar 
and filmmaker Mariolga Reyes Cruz (2018) explicitly talked about these 
projects as forms of gestating sovereignty. In a speech titled “Por quienes 
esperamos” (“Who are We Waiting For” or “The Ones We are Waiting 
For”) she said that Maria had demonstrated that Puerto Ricans didn’t 
need to wait for anyone. While both local and federal governments 
stalled, Puerto Ricans had taken care of themselves. She asserted that the 
autogestion initiatives emerging after Maria were not simply about 
taking on the task of recovery but about reimagining the future. 
Cruz went on to directly connect the wait of Maria to the wait of 
colonialism—the wait to resolve political status that Puerto Ricans have 
been engaged in for over a century—and suggested that in both cases 
what appeared to be a wait was actually a gestation process. While 
waiting for decolonization, she argued, community organizations in 
Puerto Rico had forged new visions of sovereignty: food sovereignty 
through back-to-the-land movements, territorial sovereignty through 
land occupations and community trusts, energy sovereignty (soberanía 
energetica) through solar power initiatives, and even political sover-
eignty through a reimagining of the means and forms of collective ac-
tion. She also spoke of what one might call a diasporic sovereignty 
forged by Puerto Rican communities abroad who mobilized in the wake 
of the storm to send aid in the face of governmental failure. 
Looking to the future, she said it was now time to knit together these 
forms of sovereignty (es hora de entreteger soberanias). It is unclear what 
this process will entail and where it will lead, but for Cruz, and many 
others, this archipelago of sovereignty (which reaches beyond the ter-
ritory and into the diaspora) offers a ray of hope within an otherwise 
bleak landscape. After both local and federal governments abandoned 
their citizens, forcing them to wait, and in a context where over a decade 
of austerity and over a century of US empire had already whittled down 
the expectations regarding state capacity and care, these islands of 
sovereignty offer an alternative. 
However, while Mariolga and other activists are busy gestating new 
sovereignties, the government continues to recruit new stakeholders 
who have their own vision of what might emerge out of the ruins of 
Maria. At an investor’s conference in New York, just a few months after 
Maria, I observed as the governor and his cabinet members urged US 
entrepreneurs to take advantage of Puerto Rico’s economic and colonial 
crisis. Among the many competitive advantages they ascribed to the 
territory was precisely the resilience of its population. Resilience, it 
seems, is good for business. 
4. Imagining repair 
I would like to end by giving the final word to one of the participants 
in my study, a woman that I shall call Annie, who echoed in her own way 
the same arguments that Mariolga Cruz was trying to make in her re-
marks at the university. 
Annie is an extremely youthful and stylish 71-year old retired school 
teacher, with short salt and pepper hair who is always relentlessly en-
ergetic and upbeat. I had originally met her while conducting research 
about Puerto Rico’s economic crisis. After the hurricane, I was unable to 
reach her for months because both her landline and her cellphone had 
stopped working. I later learned she had spent the hurricane alone at 
home, in a working-class suburb on the outskirts of San Juan, and later 
rode out the blackout with her daughter in Florida. I caught up with her 
a year later after she was settling back into her life in San Juan. 
With her characteristic upbeat style, she said that she suffered little 
during the hurricane. She had done everything she needed to prepare. 
She had stockpiled food, water, and batteries. She had her medicines, 
and she had cash. In other words, she was a responsible, self-sufficient 
citizen. Her home suffered little damage, and in the days following the 
storm she says she was happily in the “bubble” of her working-class 
neighborhood. Her aunts, uncles, and cousins all live nearby, so they 
were able to spend those early days together taking care of each other. 
Fig. 4. Puerto Rico se levanta greeting cards. Photo by Author.  
11 Others have defined this form of practice as “autonomous organizing” 
(Garriga-Lopez 2019). 
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Everyday, her younger cousins would venture out to get water, ice, hot 
meals, and other supplies, and they would come back with stories of long 
lines and shortages, but for Annie these were just that: stories. They were 
something you heard about, something that happened to someone else, 
not something you lived through. She kept referring to those events as 
things that happened “afuera” – outside of her little bubble. 
After a few weeks of this, her daughter in Florida sent for her and 
Annie says it was then that she truly discovered the magnitude of the 
disaster as she watched images of devastation flash across the screen. 
Still, she still insisted on cultivating resilience: “I’m very positive. I al-
ways try to get rid of the negative so I can manage daily life because if I 
start crying then I can’t get organized. And you have to stay organized. If 
I lose it [Si me voy en brote], I can’t think …” I asked her if she finally “lost 
it” once she got to Florida, but she said no: there she got busy once again, 
filling out paper work, figuring out a new city, learning how to take the 
bus, “I didn’t want to fall into sadness, so I just saw it as an adventure." 
She started to sound almost manic as she narrated what she described 
as herself in "el survival mode" but then she paused and said: “Honestly, 
I’m now sadder than I was in that survival mode, because that mode 
gives you energy and excitement. Now I am back here. Now we are 
supposed to be back to normal, but here we are … still waiting. I’m no 
longer in survival mode, now I have to absorb everything that 
happened.” She said it in precisely this way: absorber lo que ha pasado – 
take the hit, absorb the shock. 
She talked about the despair she felt when she looked around and the 
landscape was still in ruins. She also talked about the pain of losing her 
best friend: “We are not sure what happened to her. She was fine before 
Maria, and now she is in an assisted living facility and has lost her ability 
to speak.” 
Part of what upsets Annie is that climate change itself is no longer “a 
story,” no longer something you hear about happening elsewhere. She is 
worried that nobody seems to be thinking about this, that they are not 
rebuilding more sustainable stuctures, or turning to alternative energy 
sources: “Nena, we have this sun beating down on us everyday. We 
should be using that. It should be doing something more than just giving 
us skin cancer.” She is also extremely upset at how the recovery is 
unfolding: all the profiteering that is being revealed and the fact that 
rich parts of town have streetlights and look like nothing has happened, 
while her neighborhood still has no street or traffic lights. 
I asked her what she thought a fair recovery would look like and if 
she wanted more policicing— since she mentioned several times that she 
was worried about crime and mad that only the rich areas were getting 
police protection. She laughed and said no, of course not, what she 
wants is to see people’s needs attended to. She then went on to think in 
larger political terms, saying: 
We have to work towards something new. I know it won’t be inde-
pendence because these 120 years of coloniaje americano, and the 
ones we had before with the Spanish, have made us think that we 
can’t be independent. And there are no leaders … so that alternative 
is not possible. In any case, she said, what we need is real sover-
eignty, not that soberanía de papel – where they give you sovereignty 
on a piece of paper, where they have some big ceremony and the US 
declares us independent, that is not going to solve our problems on 
the day to day. That’s not what we need. What we need is real sov-
ereignty, emotional sovereignty, mental sovereignty. This is not 
about the Olympics, or Miss Universe, or a seat at the U.N. It’s about 
feeling fully human [que nos sintamos gente], it’s about feeling like a 
people [que nos sintamos pueblo]. 
In other words, for Annie, real sovereignty is about addressing the 
dehumanization of colonialism, a matter that mere independence does 
not tackle. 
She went on to say that statehood is out of the question as well 
because, “If this disaster has proved anything, it’s that the US doesn’t 
care about us. And it’s not because we’re crap; it’s that we just don’t 
matter to them. I’m not even mad about it.” When I asked her why the 
US didn’t care, she retorted: 
For whatever reason! For whatever reason. Because we are not white, 
we do not have blue eyes, because we don’t have oil. For whatever 
reason, they are no longer interested in us. They had their military 
bases here; they threw their bombs; they contaminated the land, and 
they left. They’re done. It’s like when a husband uses a woman and 
gets tired of her and leaves her. They are not interested, and there is 
no point in chasing after them because they are done. It’s over. 
Perhaps it goes without saying that Annie is divorced. However, 
comparing the Puerto Rico-US relationship to a bad romance, is a 
common practice. Even politicians and pundits recurr to it repeatedly. 
Yet, Annie gave it a particular spin: she went on to talk about how Puerto 
Rico was constantly chasing after the US as if it was Prince Charming, 
but she said the truth is “the US is not a prince; it’s just a frog.” She 
explained, “They have tremendous problems, huge racial problems, 
terrible poverty, health problems—they basically have all the same 
problems we have. So, if they can’t resolve their problems, how are they 
going to resolve ours?” She concluded by saying: 
We have to find something that works for us. We have to create 
something new. And I think that’s where we are headed. There is a 
new movement that is being forged here. It still hasn’t been born, but 
it’s about to be born. A new future for Puerto Rico is already 
developing.” 
Her words gave new meaning to the bank’s eerie slogan, "A new 
Puerto Rico lies within." 
5. From recovery to redress 
The events that have been unfolding in Puerto Rico over the past few 
years, and those that have unfolded elsewhere in other sites of racio- 
colonial disaster, require us to think more expansively about what 
disaster recovery should look like and how to build models of recovery 
that aren’t about bringing places like Puerto Rico back to their previous 
states as sites of imperial capitalism, but which instead can help us 
reimagine the very nature of the debts incurred and the damages caused. 
As Deborah Thomas (2019) and others have argued, this is about the 
larger need and desire among colonized people to find new ways of 
being human in the wake of the Plantation. For Annie, and others like 
her in Puerto Rico, the search for a post-disaster future is thus about 
more than just repairing roofs and restoring streetlights. It is also a 
matter of attending to the deep inequities and long histories of dispos-
session that had already left certain populations disproportionately 
vulnerable to disaster. 
This also a question of temporality and futurity. The victims of 
disaster, including the disaster of colonialism, have repeatedly been 
forced to wait for repair. It is easy to fall into pessimistic thinking about 
the future outcomes of all of this, particularly as ideologies of shrinking 
states and resilient individuals continue to deepen long-standing debts 
and inequities. However, among Annie and many others in Puerto Rico, 
there is a hope that this period of extended waiting, this arrested post-
colonial present, is actually a period of gestation. It is worth noting that 
emergencia in Spanish carries a double meaning: suggesting both a state 
of emergency and a state of emergence. Perhaps, for this reason, many in 
Puerto Rico remain in a hopeful wait, that what might seem to be a 
stalled present, could actually be the dawn of a new political future. 
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